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howledge support from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation.Abstract: We study the predictive power of approximately 2.5 million
stock picks submitted by individual users to the \CAPS" website run by the
Motley Fool company (www.caps.fool.com). These picks prove to be surpris-
ingly informative about future stock prices. Indeed, a strategy of shorting
stocks with a disproportionate number of negative picks on the site and
buying stocks with a disproportionate number of positive picks produces a
return of over nine percent per annum over the sample period. These results
are mostly driven by the fact that negative picks on the site strongly predict
future stock price declines; positive picks on the site produce returns that
are statistically indistinguishable from the market. A Fama French decom-
position suggests that these results are largely due to stock-picking rather
than style factors or market timing.
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1 Introduction
\Social investing" or \crowdsourcing" websites attempt to forecast stock
price performance by aggregating predictions from individual website par-
ticipants. We analyze the informational content of these predictions for
the future price movements of individual stocks. Our data consists of more
than 2.5 million stock picks provided by more than 60,000 individuals from
November 1, 2006 to December 31, 2008, a period with signicant swings
in stock market performance. These individuals made predictions through
the CAPS open access website created and operated by the Motley Fool
company (www.caps.fool.com). The Motley Fool prediction system is mo-
tivated by a hypothesis, contrary to the ecient markets hypothesis, that
posits that many individuals|each with limited information|can provide
very accurate assessments of future movements in individual stock prices, if
their information is elicited and aggregated in an appropriate fashion.
While collaborative ltering has been demonstrated to be useful in a
wide variety of contexts (such as the Ebay user rating system or the Amazon
recommendor system), it has not been demonstrated to be of value in the
challenging context of predicting stock price movements. It is natural to
ask how collaborative ltering could possibly elicit information that is not
already incorporated into stock prices: why not trade on information rather
than volunteer it without prospect of nancial gain to a public website? The
idea behind collaborative ltering of stock opinions is that individuals have
high trading costs and imprecise information. Individuals whose trading
costs exceed the expected value of their imprecise information will rationally
choose not to trade to the point where this information is fully reected in
prices. Thus, the idea behind collaborative ltering is that it aggregates the
unutilized information of such individuals.1.
We analyze the informational content of stock market picks submitted
to CAPS by tracking the performance of portfolios formed on the basis of
those picks. We intentionally use simple algorithms to create portfolios based
on positive and negative picks (predictions of increases and decreases in the
prices of individual stocks, respectively). We show that buying positive picks
and shorting negative picks produces annual returns of over nine percent over
our sample period. Using a Fama French decomposition, we show that these
excess returns are largely due to stock-picking rather than style factors or
market timing.
1Why individuals bother to post their information is another interesting question. As
discussed below, Motley Fool labels and promotes top performers in the CAPS system.
This may be a source of utility in it of itself1 INTRODUCTION 4
This paper builds on several separate strains of academic literature
within nance. First, many studies assess the ability of institutional in-
vestors to surpass market prots without taking on excessive risk. Studies of
investment professionals, such as mutual fund managers (Chevalier and El-
lison, 1999, Wermers, 2000, Pastor and Stambaugh 2002, and Baker, Litov,
Wachter, and Wurgler, 2006, among others), newsletter publishers (Met-
rick, 1999) and analysts (Mikhail, Walther, Willis, 2003) generally conclude
that a small percentage of people consistently \beat the market". However,
the results of these papers suggest that there are relatively few people who
possess either the information or the ability to successfully pick individual
stocks.
A second set of studies supports the conventional wisdom that individual
investors perform poorly as stock market investors. Odean and coauthors,
in a series of papers, exploit a large dataset of individual customer accounts
at a major discount brokerage rm to analyze the results for individuals
as traders. Odean (1999) nds that individual investors' purchases tend to
underperform their sales by a signicant margin. Barber and Odean (2000)
show that, on average, the stock choices of individual investors underperform
market indices, and that this underperformance is particularly acute for
active traders. Barber and Odean (2001a) nd that men are more likely to
be active traders than women, and that this trading hurts their portfolio
returns. They link this evidence to survey results showing that men are
more condent in their investing abilities, and conclude that overcondence
in stock-picking ability leads to underperformance. Finally, Barber, Odean,
and Zhu (2009) show that stocks purchased heavily by individual investors
in a given week tend to outperform other stocks for the next two weeks, but
then underperform the market in the subsequent months.
Despite these ndings, there is growing evidence that some individual
investors have superior information about some assets. For example, Co-
val, Hirshleifer, and Shumway (2005) demonstrate that individual investors'
trades show strong persistence in performance. This suggests that some
individuals may be able to earn abnormal prots. Furthermore, a num-
ber of papers suggest that the excess performance may result because those
individuals concentrate their portfolios in stocks for which they have an in-
formational advantage. For example, Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) and
Massa and Simonov (2006) using U.S. and Swedish data, respectively, nd
that investments in local stocks outperform non-local investments and in
the Swedish case, outperform market benchmarks. Similarly, Ivkovic, Sialm,
and Weisbenner (2008), using data on the investments of a large number of
individual investors made through a discount broker from 1991 to 1996, nd1 INTRODUCTION 5
that among households with account balances greater than $100,000, those
that hold only 1 or 2 stocks outperform those that hold 3 or more stocks
by 41 basis points per month. They also show that the excess performance
is concentrated in non-S&P500 stocks that receive little analyst coverage.
These ndings are consistent with some investors concentrating their hold-
ings in securities for which they have a true informational advantage. Such
an informational advantage would be harder to achieve for stocks that are
widely followed.
Another set of related studies considers the eect of the internet on
stock market trading and prices. The internet has lowered the cost of stock
trading, but has also made it possible for individuals to participate in the
stock market as commentators on message boards. One common theme of
prior research is that the internet may exacerbate behavioral biases that lead
to suboptimal investments (Barber and Odean, 2001b), and possibly even
create new methods for stock manipulation (Frieder and Zittrain, 2007).
A series of recent papers assesses the informational content of postings on
message boards such as Yahoo! and Raging Bull as well as the eect of
these messages on stock trading and prices. The most robust nding in this
literature identies a connection between the volume of messages about a
stock and future trading of that stock|a high volume of messages tends
to predict higher future trading volumes and pricing volatility (Antweiler
and Frank, 2004). In terms of information, message board postings overlap
in content with forthcoming news stories (Antweiler and Frank, 2004), and
earnings announcements (Bagnoli, Daniel and Watts, 1999), but message
boards promulgate them sooner than traditional media sources.
Yet there is at best limited evidence that the informational content
of message board postings predicts future price movements for individual
stocks. Even though message board postings may predict future news ar-
ticles, the news articles themselves have limited and short-lived predictive
power on future stock prices (Tetlock, 2007). Similarly, the assessed corre-
lation between message board content and stock price movements is gener-
ally small and short-lived (Das and Chen, 2007, Tumarkin and Whitelaw,
2001, Antweiler and Frank, 2004), though very unusual volumes of mes-
sage board activity correlate with substantial next-day price movements for
thinly traded microcap stocks (Sabherwal, Sarkar, and Zhang, 2008) and
negative future returns for a broader set of stocks (Antweiler and Frank,
2006).
This paper departs substantially from the previous literature on message
board content because of the nature of the data compiled by the Motley
Fool CAPS website. CAPS diers from stock message boards in three im-1 INTRODUCTION 6
portant ways that facilitate our research. First, CAPS users make specic
predictions about the future price of a particular stock. In contrast, anal-
ysis of message board postings requires a systematic language-extraction
algorithm to classify each message imperfectly as (say) \Buy/Sell/Hold".
Second, CAPS is designed to promote the reputations of its participants.
Each player is rated based on the performance of previous picks, and each
player's past history of picks and performance can be viewed by others.
Third, CAPS synthesizes the history of past picks to produce a rating for
each stock (from the worst rating of \One Star" to the best rating of \Five
Stars") that provides a single prediction for each stock at each point in time.
A nal set of related papers concerns online prediction markets such
as Intrade. These websites host competitive prediction markets for trade
of shares that will pay o if a particular event occurs (e.g. Rick Santo-
rum receives the Republican presidential nomination). Recent work such as
Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004) and Wolfers (2004) examine the functioning of
markets. In many ways, CAPS can be thought of as a hybrid of a message
board and a prediction market. First, like a prediction market but unlike
a message board, CAPS users make very specic predictions. In the case
of CAPs, these predictions are always about the future price of a particular
stock. In contrast, analysis of message board postings requires a system-
atic language-extraction algorithm to classify each message imperfectly as
(say) \Buy/Sell/Hold". Second, CAPS synthesizes the history of past picks
to produce a rating for each stock (from the worst rating of "One Star"
to the best rating of "Five Stars". Prediction markets aggregate predic-
tions by displaying a market price that clears the market. Message boards
do not generally attempt to aggregate predictions. Third, message boards
do not generally attempt to incentivize participants to produce high qual-
ity predictions. Prediction markets are automatically incentivized because
participants receive nancial payouts if their predictions are correct. In
contrast, incentives in Motley Fool exist, but are less explicit. Participants
have no direct nancial incentives to participate. Instead, participants re-
ceive reputation scores and the best players with the best reputation scores
are highlighted on the site.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section
3 provides descriptive statistics based only on absolute returns. Section
4 analyzes portfolio returns using a Four-Factor decomposition. Section 5
concludes.2 DATA 7
2 Data
The data for this study was provided by the Motley Fool company under a
license agreement with Harvard University. The data contains all stock mar-
ket picks from the CAPS website from November 1, 2006 through December
31, 2008. The Motley Fool compiles information on each participant's picks,
and uses this information to rate both players and stocks. CAPS only allows
picks for stocks that have a price of at least $1.50 per share and a market
cap of at least $100 Million at any given time.
CAPS allows participants to make predictions about the future move-
ments of individual stocks from their current prices. Many websites, includ-
ing CAPS, Amazon.com, and eBay use some kind of reputation system to
measure past performance of website participants.2. CAPS assigns a rating
to each participant as a function of the objective performance of the stocks
that she/he picked. Similar to Amazon.com's \top reviewers" program (but
in contrast to eBay), it is not clear what material benet a participant gains
from garnering a positive reputation on CAPS, though CAPS includes a
number of features that promote interest in participant reputation. Each
participant's player rating is publicly available and represents that partici-
pant's current percentile ranking (from 0 to 100) based on the market perfor-
mance of past picks.3 Participants with ratings of 80 or above, representing
those in the top fth of player ratings, are labelled as \CAPS All Stars" and
their picks are highlighted throughout the website.
The data provided by Motley Fool for the study includes 2,704,719 dis-
tinct picks encompassing 7,287 dierent stocks and 113,154 dierent user-
names.4 As part of the data for the study, Motley Fool also provided the
daily CAPS rankings of these stocks from \1-Star" (the worst) to\5-Stars"
(the best) for this one-year period. The CAPS website states that these
stock rankings are based on a proprietary algorithm, aggregating individual
player positive and negative picks using a methodology that gives higher
2On eBay, for example, participants are invited to rate individual transactions with
others as buyers and sellers (although they receive no direct rewards for doing so). The
resulting scores for participants (number of rankings and percent positive) have been
shown to be of sucient credibility to participants that the sellers ratings have been show
to aect both the price and the probability that a listed good is sold on eBay (Resnick
and Zeckhauser, 2002; Resnick, Zeckhauser, Swanson, and Lockwood, 2006; Cabral and
Hortacsu, 2010.
3Participants with fewer than seven CAPS picks are not given player ratings.
4An individual person can register more than once on the CAPS website and make
picks using multiple \player names". The exact number of distinct participants who have
made picks on the CAPS website is unknown.2 DATA 8
weight to players with higher rankings (i.e. better past performance) and to
more recent picks. 5 We note that the CAPS methodology contrasts with
that used in other stock market-oriented crowdsourcing websites. For ex-
ample, Piqqem.com weights all participants opinions equally to form overall
predictions, consistent with their stated philosophy that \every individual
has some unique knowledge that is relevant to at least some set of stocks".
Each star rating corresponds to a quintile of stocks based on an under-
lying (unreported) CAPS cardinal rating for those stocks. That is, \1 Star"
stocks consist of those stocks at the 20th percentile or below in cardinal
ranking, whereas \5 Star" stocks consist of those stocks at the 80th per-
centile or above in cardinal ranking based on past CAPS picks. We were
given no information about the proprietary system used to generate these
rankings and made no attempt to identify its properties.
We compiled stock price data from the Center for Research and Security
Prices (CRSP) for November 1, 2006 (the ocial launch date for CAPS) to
June 30, 2009 (six months after the end of our sample of CAPS stock picks).
Since CRSP and CAPS use dierent identication numbers for stocks, we
matched stocks across the two databases by ticker symbol and by name. We
were able to match 6,429 stocks using this methodology. We used Yahoo
Finance for historical pricing data for 385 stocks that do not appear in CRSP
but that received at least ten CAPS picks during at least one of the ve
trading periods identied below in Table 1.6 Our matched database of stock
picks from CAPS and stock prices from CRSP/Yahoo includes incorporates
2,695,044 CAPS picks, comprising 99.6% of the picks in the original data set.
The remaining unmatched picks are primarily for small and often de-listed
stocks.
We will present results for stocks in dierent size classes; we classify
companies with market caps of more than $5 Billion as \Large Caps", com-
panies with market caps between $1 and $5 Billion as \Medium Caps" and
companies with market caps less than $1 Billion as \Small Caps".7
5See http://caps.fool.com/help.aspx for publicly available information on the
CAPS rating algorithm.
6One distinction between the CRSP data and the Yahoo Finance data is that stock
prices listed in Yahoo Finance have already been adjusted to account for dividends and
splits. We used a standard method to adjust the CRSP prices for dividends and splits,
essentially assuming that dividend distributions are reinvested in the given stock. We
made one adjustment to the Yahoo data, assigning the closing price on a day where a
stock was not traded to be the opening price on the next that the stock is traded. By
contrast, Yahoo uses a default procedure of listing the closing price to equal the previous
day's closing price on a day that a stock is not traded.
7CRSP provides the number of shares outstanding for each stock, so we compute2 DATA 9
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Figure 1: Total CAPS Picks by Month
Figure 1 graphs the number of picks submitted to the CAPS website for
each month during the sample period. CAPS enjoyed a steady increase in
popularity over time from its launch through the middle of 2008, but the
number of picks submitted per month fell in the last half of 2008. This
pattern suggests that some users may have lost interest in participating in
CAPS over the course of the nancial crisis and coincident downturn in stock
prices in late 2008.
2.1 Trading Periods in the Sample
This study focuses attention on stock returns in ve separate six month
trading periods: (1) January 1 to June 30, 2007; (2) July 1 to December 31,
2007; (3) January 1 to June 30, 2008; (2) July 1 to December 31, 2008; (5)
January 1 to June 30, 2009. We assess the predictive power of CAPS ratings
the market cap for stocks listed in CRSP for each trading day in the sample by simply
multiplying this number of shares by (unadjusted) closing price. We were unable to nd
similar information in Yahoo Finance for most of the 170 stocks where we used Yahoo to
compile historical price information. Therefore, we estimated the historical market caps
for this subset of stocks based on the current market caps listed for these companies on
the CAPS website as of February, 2009 and February, 2010.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR CAPS PICKS 10
Table 1: Sample Periods for CAPS Picks and Stock Market Returns
Trading
Period
Stock Market Trading Days Dates for Relevant CAPS Picks
1 Jan 1 2007 to June 30 2007 Nov 1 2006 to Dec 31 2006
2 July 1 2007 to Dec 31 2007 Jan 1 2007 to June 30 2007
3 Jan 1 2008 to June 30 2008 July 1 2007 to Dec 31 2007
4 July 1 2008 to Dec 31 2008 Jan 1 2008 to June 30 2008
5 Jan 1 2009 to June 30 2009 July 1 2008 to Dec 31 2008
in each trading period as a function of the CAPS rating for each stock at
the beginning of that period. Similarly, we assess the predictive power of
individual CAPS picks as a function of the performance of stocks in the
subsequent trading period after each pick was submitted. Since CAPS was
launched in November 2006, Trading Period 1 is associated with only two
months of prior CAPS picks; every other Trading Period is associated with
six months of prior CAPS picks. Table 1 summarizes this information.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the number of picks submitted to
the CAPS website. On average, CAPS participants, like most stock market
analysts, were relatively bullish, producing a ratio of about ve positive picks
per negative pick. Further, this ratio remained fairly constant over time|
suggesting that CAPS users were not particularly successful at timing the
market or anticipating the onset of the nancial crisis. CAPS participants
were signicantly more likely to submit negative picks for Small Cap stocks
than for Medium or Large Cap stocks.
For the analysis in this study, we will use dierent aggregated measures
of player picks in order to assess the \crowd wisdom." We rst use Motley
Fool's published rankings of individual stocks. We also use measures of the
extent to which stocks have been picked as positive picks and the extent to
which stocks have been picked as negative picks.
3 Descriptive Statistics for CAPS Picks and Sub-
sequent Six-Month Returns
In this section, we take a preliminary look at the relationship between indi-
vidual picks in the CAPS system and subsequent stock market returns. We
start by examining returns where the unit of observation is the individual
pick. Table 3 compares the six-month returns for positive and negative picks
submitted to the CAPS website. To standardize the comparisons across cat-3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR CAPS PICKS 11
Table 2: Positive and Negative Picks Submitted to the CAPS Website
Number of
Picks
Percentage
of Picks
Percent Positive
Picks
1. Whole Sample 2,684,733 100% 80.8%
2. Large Cap ($above $5B) 985,632 39.1% 86.2%
3. Medium Cap ($1B{$5B) 678,792 26.8% 82.6%
4. Small Cap ($100M{$1B) 860,874 34.2% 77.3%
5. Trading Period 1 157,696 5.9% 84.9%
6. Trading Period 2 486,268 18.1% 82.3%
7. Trading Period 3 612,778 22.8% 80.0%
8. Trading Period 4 834,053 31.1% 81.9%
9. Trading Period 5 593,938 22.1% 78.6%
Tabulations in row 1 include picks for stocks with market caps too small
to be included in analysis.
egories in this table, we compute six month returns for each stock in each
of our ve trading periods based on the periods listed in Table 1. That is,
we compute the returns associated with each pick based on the six-month
returns for that stock in the next trading period|so a pick submitted in
August 2007 is associated with stock market returns in Trading Period 3
beginning in January 2008. The overall return reported below, then, is the
average return of all positive picks during the relevant time period and all
negative picks over the relevant time period.8 Since we impose an arti-
cial lag between the submission of most picks and the calculation of market
returns associated with that pick, the summary results in Table 3 likely
underestimate the information contained in each pick.
Several systematic patterns stand out in Table 3. First, the average six-
month return in most periods was negative in most cases. Trading Periods 1
and 5 produced nominally positive returns, but these were more than oset
by the huge negative returns in Trading Period 4.
More interestingly, Positive Picks systematically outperformed Negative
8Thus, consider the example where only two stocks existed in the universe. Assume
Stock A was the subject of 5 negative picks and 10 positive picks in a trading period and
Stock B was the subject of 2 negative picks and 20 positive picks. The \return on negative
picks" reported above is then the weighted average of Stock A and Stock B's returns in the
trading period, with the weights being 5/7 and 2/7, respectively. The \return on positive
picks" reported above is the weighted average of Stock A and Stock B's returns in the
trading period, with the weights being 1/3 and 2/3, respectively.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR CAPS PICKS 12
Table 3: Returns for Positive and Negative CAPS Picks
Return on Return on Return on Return on
Positive Negative Equal-Weight Value-Weight
Picks Picks Mkt Index Mkt Index
Whole Sample -11.8% -16.0% -11.2% -10.7%
Large Cap -11.6% -16.2% -12.5% -11.2%
Medium Cap -11.0% -13.3% -11.1% -10.6%
Small Cap -12.5% -17.5% -10.9% -10.3%
Trading Period 1 9.8% 6.5% 7.1% 6.9%
Trading Period 2 -1.6% -10.1% -10.9% -0.1%
Trading Period 3 -11.6% -23.0% -13.7% -11.8%
Trading Period 4 -40.2% -37.1% -30.8% -28.1%
Trading Period 5 16.7% 10.9% 15.9% 3.2%
Picks, with simple dierences of at least 2.5% in average returns in every
period except for Trading Period 4. These dierences are strikingly large in
magnitude| across all ve trading periods, a pick-weighted portfolio (equal
investment for each pick) based on buying positive picks produced a six-
month return of  11% whereas a pick-weighted portfolio based on buying
negative picks produced a six-month return of  15:4%. Since each trading
period is six months, this dierence of 4.4 percentage points translates into
an enormous dierence of approximately nine percentage points in returns
per year.
Furthermore, Table 3 shows that the relationship between returns for
Positive vs. Negative Picks varies very little by market cap. In particu-
lar, Positive Picks outperformed Negative Picks by about ve percentage
points in six-month returns for both Large and Small Cap stocks, though
by approximately half as much for Medium Cap Stocks.
The positive and negative picks submitted by the individual players in
CAPS form the basis for the ranking assigned by Motley Fool to each stock|
1 star to 5 stars. Figure 2 graphs simple average returns for stocks with each
Motley Fool ranking for each of our ve six month trading periods. In each
case, we classify stocks by their Motley Fool (quintile) rankings from the day
before the start of the trading period. The return for a given stock in each
period is simply the percentage change in stock price from the beginning3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR CAPS PICKS 13
to the end of that trading period. So, for example, stocks with a 1-star
rating on December 31, 2006 had an average return of 3.7% in the rst
trading period (Jan 2007 to June 2007), while stocks with a 5-star rating on
December 31, 2006 had an average return of 13.7% during that same trading
period. This dierence of 11 percentage points in returns translates into a
dierence of (approximately) 22 percentage points in annualized returns.
2 
  
  
  
  
3 
        
  
4  
        
  
5  
        
  
1  
  
-40%
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
Jan 07 - June 07 Jul 07 - Dec 07 Jan 08 - June 08 Jul 08 - Dec 08 Jan 09 - Dec 09
1 Star
2 Stars
3 Stars
4 Stars
5 Stars
Figure 2: Six Month Return by Motley Fool Rating
Consistent with the patterns in Table 3, there is a clear monotonic re-
lationship between Motley Fool rating and average stock returns in each of
the rst three trading periods. Averaging across these three periods, 5-star
stocks produced returns 14.6 percentage points higher than 1-star stocks in
six-month returns (29.2 percent annualized). The major reversal occurred
in period 4, during the height of the nancial crisis. During this period, 1
star stocks performed best and 5 star stocks performed worst. Averaging
across the ve half-year periods, 5 star stocks outperformed 1 star stocks by
9 percentage points.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR CAPS PICKS 14
3.1 Alternate Rankings Based on Positive and Negative Picks
We also used the data for individual picks to compute our own stock rankings
in order to separately assess the predictive power of positive and negative
CAPS picks. For each trading period, we tabulated the number of active
positive picks and the number of active negative picks for each stock sub-
mitted to CAPS in the six months just prior to the start of that trading
period.9 We then grouped stocks by market cap and classied each stock
with at least ten active picks from the previous six months into quintiles.
One classication was based entirely on the number of positive picks that
the stock received; the second classication was based solely on the number
of negative picks that the stock received.
For our Positive Pick Ranking, we assigned a ranking of 5 to the top
quintile of stocks and a ranking of 1 to the bottom quintile of stocks based
on a simple count of active positive picks within each subgroup of stocks
by market cap. That is, the stocks with Positive Pick Ranking of 5 in any
trading period were those stocks that were in the top 20% among \Large
Cap", \Medium Cap" or \Small Cap" stocks in the count of active positive
picks on the rst trading day of the period.10
Similarly, for our Negative Pick Ranking, we assigned a ranking of 1
to the least frequently picked quintile of stocks and a ranking of 5 to the
most frequently picked quintile of stocks based on a simple count of active
negative picks within each subgroup of stocks by market cap. That is, we
code both our Negative Pick Ranking and our Positive Pick Ranking so that
the ranking of 5 in each case corresponds to the group of stocks about which
players are most optimistic.
Clearly, the Motley Fool ranking is some aggregation of Negative Picks
and Positive Picks. However, depending on the pattern of picks submit-
ted by dierent players, in principle, a stock's ranking in the Negative Pick
Ranking and a stock's ranking in the Positive Pick Ranking may be posi-
tively correlated, negatively correlated or uncorrelated.
Figure 3 provides a summary of the positive pick portfolio, constructed
9CAPS participants have the opportunity to \close" a pick at any time, \locking in"
the market returns associated with that pick. Once a pick is closed, subsequent changes
in prices associated with that pick have no eect on the ranking of the participant who
submitted that pick. For the purposes of creating \Positive Pick" and \Negative Pick"
rankings in each Trading Period, we exclude picks that were both submitted and closed
by a participant in the previous six month period.
10We rst divide stocks into groups by Market Cap and then order them by number
of positive picks because there is an empirical positive relationship between cap size and
number of picks (both positive and negative) submitted to CAPS.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR CAPS PICKS 15
identically to Figure 2, except that the returns are shown for unweighted
Positive Pick Portfolio quintiles. Figure 4 provides a summary of the Nega-
tive Pick Portfolio.
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Figure 3: Six Month Return by Positive Pick Rating
The results for the Positive Pick Ratings are similar to those for the
overall Motley Fool rating, but smaller. The 5 star portfolio outperforms
the 1 star portfolio by an average of 2 percentage points across the ve six-
month periods (with dramatic underperformance in the fourth period). The
Negative Pick Ratings 5 star portfolio outperforms the 1 star portfolio by 8
percentage points over the time period. The 5 star Negative Pick Portfolio
outperforms the 1 star portfolio in every one of the 5 periods, even during
the Period 4 nancial crisis. Interestingly, Motley Fool stockpickers make
Negative Picks much less frequently than Positive Picks, yet these results
suggest that Negative Picks are, on average, more reliable during our sample
period.4 PERFORMANCE DECOMPOSITION 16
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Figure 4: Six Month Return by Negative Pick Rating
4 Performance Decomposition
We have demonstrated that the stocks ranked highly by Motley Fool par-
ticipants earn higher subsequent raw returns than the stocks ranked poorly
by Motley Fool participants during our sample period. The portfolios of
stocks favored by Motley Fool participants may have dierent returns from
the portfolios of stocks disfavored by Motley Fool participants because they
have dierent risk or style factors on average, because they have time-varying
dierences in risk or style factors, or the dierences may be independent of
risk or style factors. Thus, we decompose dierences that can be attributed
to market or style factors, and dierences that cannot be attributed to mar-
ket or style factors.
We use the classic style/risk factors identied by Fama and French (1996)
and Carhart (1997) to decompose performance. Fama and French (1996)
identied three measures that have been demonstrated to predict future
stock returns. The rst of these factors is the \Market Return" less the risk
free rate, RMRF, which can be used to control for correlation between the
returns in a portfolio of individual stocks and the returns on the market4 PERFORMANCE DECOMPOSITION 17
portfolio. (For example, this correlation would be high for a portfolio of
high-beta stocks, indicating a high-risk portfolio.) The second factor is a
value/growth factor, HML, which can be used to control for the composition
of a portfolio of stocks in terms of book value relative to market value. The
third factor is a small stock factor, SMB, which controls for composition of
a portfolio of stocks in terms of market cap value. We use the three factors
identied by Fama and French in our analysis along with a fourth factor,
Momentum, Mom, identied by Carhart (1997). The Momentum factor
can be used to control for the composition of a portfolio of stocks in terms
of previous year's stock market performance.
We observe Motley Fool participants in the aggregate over 5 quarters.
We separately examine the Motley Fool CAPS-ranked quintile portfolios, the
Positive Pick quintile portfolios and the Negative Pick quintile portfolios.
For each of these portfolio types, we focus on the investment strategy of
buying the 5th quintile portfolio (highest, or 5 star) and shorting the 1st
quintile portfolio (lowest, or 1 star). We compute the one-day returns for
each of the 5 rating portfolios for each trading day from January 1, 2007 to
June 30, 2009. There are 628 trading days under study.
Our decomposition strategy isolates the unexplained alpha after control-
ling for various factors. To understand the decomposition strategy, consider
the mean daily raw return net of the risk-free rate:
A =
P
t(rij   rft)
T
allof (A)
Where T is the number of trading days. Of course, since the risk free rate is
fairly stable, the behavior of A is very similar to the raw returns examined
above. We also consider the constant term from two regressions:
rij   rft = B + RMRFt1 + SMBt2 + HMLt3 + Momt4 + eit
(B)
rij   rft = C + (RMRFtxIt)B1 + (SMBtxIt)B2 + (HMLtxIt)B3
+ (MomtxIt)B4 + eit (C)
Where RMRF, SMB, HML and Mom are the four as described above and
It is a vector of indicator variables for each of the 5 trading periods. Here
B is the return net of loadings on the Fama French factors and momentum
factor and C is the return net of the four factors when the weights on the
four factors have been allowed to vary by trading period.
Following Wermers (2000), we can decompose the average return net
of the risk free rate in (A) into three components of interest. First, C is4 PERFORMANCE DECOMPOSITION 18
the return net of time-varying four factors. This is the return that can-
not be explained at all by market timing or style factors and thus, this is
the \stock-picking" return earned by the strategy. Next, B   C is the
\market-timing" return. If Motley Fool participants systematically favored
stocks that covaried with risk or style portfolios that were going to earn high
raw returns, but picked average-returning stocks within each style factor,
we could observe positive market timing returns but zero \stock-picking"
return. Finally, A   B is the portion of the return attributable to the
average style or risk weightings of Motley Fool participants. Thus, for ex-
ample, if Motley Fool participants chose stocks that had a high correlation
with the returns of small cap stocks minus large cap stocks, and the SMB
portfolio had signicant returns relative to the market over our entire sample
period, then a signicant part of the return would be attributable to style
factors. Note then, that this decomposition is complete: the overall return
A equals the \stock-picking" return (C) plus the \market timing" return
(B   C) plus the \average style" return (A   B).
The results for the estimated s in specications (A), (B), and (C) and
the resulting decompositions are shown in Table 4. We show the results
using the Motley Fool CAPS-ranked quintile portfolios, the Positive Pick
quintile portfolios, and the Negative Pick quintile portfolios.
The results are quite striking. Both the Negative Pick quintile portfolio
strategy and the MF quintile portfolio strategy earn signicantly positive
returns, on average, net of (constant) Fama French factors, as shown in
(B). The Positive Pick quintile portfolio strategy fails to earn signicantly
positive returns. Indeed, for all three portfolios, controlling for the average
style or risk factors has little impact on the magnitude of the estimated
excess returns.
When allowing for time-varying Fama French and momentum factors,
however, we see that only the Negative Pick quintile portfolio continues to
show signicantly positive alpha. The decomposition suggests that the Neg-
ative Pick quintile portfolio strategy has positive and statistically signicant
returns attributable to stock picking and small negative returns associated
with average style and market timing. In contrast, the Positive Pick quintile
portfolio has strongly negative return attributable to stock picking and pos-
itive returns attributable to market timing which nets out to almost zero.
Unsurprisingly, since the Motley Fool portfolio must be some combination
of the positive and negative picks, it nets out to small positive stock picking
and market timing factors.
We also illustrate how the estimated time-varying 4-factor alphas evolve
over time for all ve of the quintile portfolios in the following gures. In4 PERFORMANCE DECOMPOSITION 19
Table 4: Return Decomposition.
MF Positive Negative
(A) overall 0.066 0.012 0.056
(1.42) (0.35) (1.63)
(B) controlling for 4 factors 0.062 0.009 0.057
(2.16) (0.31) (2.84)
(C) controlling for time-varying four factors 0.029  0:055 0.069
(1.22) (2.23) (3.86)
Performance Decomposition
return attributable to stock pricing (C) 0.029  0:055 0.069
return attributable to market-timing
(B){(C)
0.033 0.064  0:012
return attributable to style (A){(B) 0.004 0.003  0:001
Table 4: Regressions using daily returns from buying the 5th quintile portfo-
lio and shorting the 1st quintile portfolio in each category (in percents|e.g.
100). For the both the Negative Pick Portfolio and the Positive Pick
portfolio, the 5th quintile is dened as the set of stocks about which CAPS
participants are most optimistic. Results in (A), (B), and (C) show constant
term () from regressions. t-statistics are in parentheses.4 PERFORMANCE DECOMPOSITION 20
each case, we estimated the Alpha coecient for each portfolio relative to
Portfolio 1 for each Trading Period.
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Figure 5: Estimated Alpha After Four-Factor Filtering: Motley Fool Rank-
ing. The gure shows alpha for each star quintile portfolio minus the alpha
of the 1 star quintile portfolio.
Consistent with the results above, the estimated alphas in Figure 5 are on
net positive for all four of the quintile portfolios relative to the rst quintile
portfolio. Furthermore, there is a systematically monotonic pattern for the
estimated alphas in each of the rst two trading periods. That is, within
each portfolio of stocks with a given ranking higher rated stocks performed
better than each portfolio of stocks with a lower ranking during each of the
rst three periods period after four-factor ltering. However, four-factor
ltering produces qualitatively dierent results from the raw returns data
for the last two trading periods. In each of those periods, 5-star stocks
perform worse than stocks of all other rankings and have negative estimated
alpha values. The positive estimated alphas for 5-star stocks is statistically
signicant at the 5% level in each of the rst two periods, but neither of
the negative estimated alphas for 5-star stocks for the last two periods is4 PERFORMANCE DECOMPOSITION 21
statistically signicant.11
Figures 6 and 7 present Estimated alphas for each period for our alterna-
tive Positive Pick and Negative Pick Rankings quintile portfolios. Compar-
ing Figures 5 and 6, rankings based on Positive Picks have estimated alpha
values that are systematically more negative than the estimated alpha val-
ues for the overall CAPS ratings. The estimated alphas for 5-star stocks
based on Positive Picks are negative in every period and are both large in
magnitude and statistically signicant in trading periods 4 and 5, suggest-
ing that 5-star stocks based on Positive Picks performed signicantly worse
than 1-star stocks based on Positive Picks in these periods after four-factor
ltering.
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Figure 6: Estimated Alpha After Four-Factor Filtering: Positive Pick Rank-
ing. The gure shows alpha for each star quintile portfolio minus the alpha
of the 1 star quintile portfolio.
11The estimated negative alpha in trading period 4 is of the same magnitude as the
estimated positive alphas for the previous three periods, but interestingly, the standard
error on this estimated value is about twice as large as the standard errors in previous
periods|consistent with the observation of unusual variations in daily movements in stock
prices during the last half of 2008.4 PERFORMANCE DECOMPOSITION 22
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Figure 7: Estimated Alpha After Four-Factor Filtering: Negative Pick Rank-
ing, The gure shows alpha for each star quintile portfolio minus the alpha
of the 1 star quintile portfolio.
By contrast, comparing Figures 5 and 7, rankings based on Negative
Picks have estimated alpha values that are systematically more positive
than those for the overall CAPS ratings. The estimated alphas for Portfolio
5 (once again, these estimated alphas are relative to Portfolio 1) are positive
in every period and are statistically signicantly dierent than 0 in every
period except for trading period 3.
4.1 Robustness
An immediate concern with our analysis is that the exceptional performance
of the Negative Pick portfolio may derive from thinly traded Small Cap
stocks. Recall that, at the time of our study, CAPS only allowed picks for
stocks that have a price of at least $1.50 per share and a market cap of at
least $100 Million at any given time. Furthermore, we construct our pick
rankings by subdividing twenty percent of each of the Small Cap Stocks, the
Medium Cap Stocks, and the Large Cap stocks into each pick ranking. Thus,
by construction, there are as many Small Cap stocks in the 5th quintile of4 PERFORMANCE DECOMPOSITION 23
the Negative Pick Portfolio as there are in the 1st quintile. Nonetheless, we
undertake a robustness check by examining the performance of the Motley
Fool ratings, our Positive Pick Portfolio ratings, and our Negative Pick
Portfolio ratings by market capitalization grouping. Table 5 reports time-
varying Four Factor alphas, as in Figures 4 through 6 for each Star category
for each capitalization grouping.
Table 5: Estimated alphas from Four Factor Model for Quintile Portfolios
by Market Capitalization.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2 Star 0.047 -0.035 0.04 0.022 -0.014 -0.001 0.02 0.026 0.061
(0.027) (0.022) (0.021) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) (0.02)
3 Star 0.047 -0.019 0.037 0.024 -0.003 -0.005 0.022 0.04 0.077
(0.027) (0.022) (0.021) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) (0.02)
4 Star 0.052 -0.009 0.031 0.01 -0.038 -0.009 0.034 0.061 0.084
(0.027) (0.022) (0.021) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) (0.02)
5 Star 0.041 -0.022 0.04 -0.004 -0.069 -0.064 0.029 0.052 0.092
(0.027) (0.022) (0.021) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) (0.02)
Ranking MF MF MF Pos Pos Pos Neg Neg Neg
Cap Size Large Medium Small Large Medium Small Large Med Small
N Obs 628 628 628 628 628 628 628 628 628
R-Sq 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98
We also consider one possible concern about the way that pick ratings
are calculated. We produce Positive and Negative Pick ratings for all stocks
that have at least ten active picks from the past six months at the start of
each Trading Period. This creates the following measurement issue: if there
are two stocks with no active negative picks from the past six months, stock
1 would be assigned a Negative Pick rating if it had ten active positive picks,
but not if it only had eight active positive picks from the past six months
at the start of a trading period.
To assess this possible contamination between the Positive and Negative
Pick ratings, we varied the requirement of 10 active picks to 20 and 50 active
picks from the past six months to be included in the rankings. Table 6 lists
the number of stocks that receive Positive and Negative pick ratings in each
period with these varying requirements. Increasing the requirement from 10
to 50 Active Picks reduces the number of rated stocks by about half in most4 PERFORMANCE DECOMPOSITION 24
Table 6: Number of Rated Stocks as Function of Active Picks Required for
Rating
Active Picks
Required for
Rating
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5
10 2,413 4,046 4,177 4,138 3,284
20 1,512 3,090 3,292 3,344 2.507
50 633 1,623 1,949 2,104 1,431
periods.
Table 7 compares the estimated alpha values for three dierent rankings|
Motley Fool, Positive Pick and Negative Pick ratings|as we vary the num-
ber of active picks required for a stock to be rated. The estimated alphas
for each ranking scheme change relatively little with these variations in the
required number of active picks. With the most rigorous requirement of
50 active picks for a stock to be rated, the estimated alpha for the 5-Star
Positive Pick ratings remains negative but loses statistical signicance. But
our more important nding|that the Negative Pick ratings have positive
and signicant estimated alphas, continues to hold with these more rigorous
ranking rules.
Conclusion
Our investigation of the Motley Fool CAPS system shows that CAPS predic-
tions are surprisingly informative about future stock prices. In particular,
while we don't nd much predictive capability of positive stock picks, we do
nd that negative picks do predict future stock price declines. Our Fama
French decomposition suggests that these are results are due to stock picking
rather than style factors or market timing.
It may not be surprising that the collaborative ltering technology is
more successful at predicting abnormally negative future stock performance
than it is at predicting abnormally positive future stock performance. The
literature surrounding short sales (for example, Jones and Lamont, 2002 and
Boehme, Danielsen, and Sorescu, 2006), suggests that acting on negative
information about the prospects for a stock can be more costly and dicult
than acting on positive information about the prospects for a stock. These
papers nd support for the hypothesis of Miller (1977) that dispersion of
investor opinion in the presence of short-sale constraints may lead to stock4 PERFORMANCE DECOMPOSITION 25
Table 7: Estimated Alphas for Pick Rankings with Varying Numbers of
Picks Required for Ranking Using Time-Varying Four Factor Alphas
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2-Star Stock .025 .040 .040  :000 .014 .017 .044 .047 .054
(.017) (.019) (.021) (.017) (.019) (.023) (.015) (.017) (.023)
3-Star Stock .030 .050 .059 .002 .016  :008 .057 .057 .054
(.017) (.019) (.021) (.017) (.019) (.023) (.015) (.017) (.023)
4-Star Stock .031 .052 .060  :013  :009  :013 .069 .070 .065
(.017) (.019) (.021) (.017) (.019) (.023) (.015) (.017) (.023)
5-Star Stock .029 .053 .066  :055  :045  :046 .069 .087 .080
(.017) (.019) (.021) (.017) (.019) (.023) (.015) (.017) (.023)
Ranking Pos Pos Pos Neg Neg Neg
System MF MF MF Pick Pick Pick Pick Pick Pick
Active Picks
for Rating
10 20 50 10 20 50 10 20 50
N obs 628 628 628 628 628 628 628 628 628
R-squared 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.97 .99 .98 .97
price overvaluation. This may be particularly true for smaller traders.
Interesting questions remain about what factors lead the CAPS system
to predict future stock returns. In future work, we hope to analyze the
text written by participants as part of the pick submission process. More
generally, we will examine whether there are ways to judge ex ante which
participants picks have relatively more predictive power.4 PERFORMANCE DECOMPOSITION 26
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